Social Policy Bonds
Ronnie Horesh
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Social Policy Bonds
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Why no Social Policy Bonds?

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Why no Social Policy Bonds?
Social Policy Bonds have been in the public arena since 1988, when I first talked about them in New Zealand but, as far as I know, they have never been issued in the decades since then. Contrast this with Social Impact Bonds, now being issued in about 25 countries. SIBs are the non-tradeable version of Social Policy Bonds. While tradeability sounds like a technical detail, it actually has a few critical implications about which I have written here and here.

A major difficulty with issuing Social Policy Bonds is that they don't readily lend themselves to experimentation: small-scale trials over a limited geographic area that are short term in nature. Neither do they show much advantage over conventional policy when we already (roughly) know how to achieve a specified social goal. For instance: take the goal of improving a lake's water quality. We could issue Social Policy aiming to reduce the levels of pollutants in the water. But, if the main sources of pollution are easy to identify, then there is no need to introduce middlemen, in the form of bond traders and investors in the bonds, to achieve that which regulation or taxes on polluters could do more simply.

No, where Social Policy Bonds work best is when we don't know how to achieve the goal, and where there is time for different approaches to be researched, tried, the failures terminated, and the more promising ones implemented: goals that will require diverse (over different areas) and adaptive (varying with time) approaches, and a mix of them. That's what governments find difficult, but it's what is necessary to achieve broad, long-term, complex goals, such as ending war, or achieving universal literacy.

When we basically know how to achieve a goal, Social Policy Bonds aren't necessary. In the lake example, and  assuming we are talking of a time frame of no more than a few years, regulation or polluter-pays taxation would achieve our goal without the need for an untried, controversial, and somewhat unconventional financial instrument. it is with broader goals, — something like improving an entire country's inland water quality — and over a longer time period, that a bond regime could play a useful role. There would be time and the incentive for motivated bondholders to research, experiment and continuously refine an array of approaches, optimised for time and space, to achieve the goal as cost-effectively as possible.

Arising from this discussion, key criteria for a goal that is most likely to benefit from being targeted by Social Policy Bonds are:

  • the goal is long term,
  • the goal is broad,
  • the goal will require diverse, adaptive approaches and, quite likely, a mix of these, and
  • nobody really has much idea about how to achieve the goal.

There are quite a few such goals, many at the national or global level, and I discuss them elsewhere on this site - see Applications in the left-hand menu. The danger is that applying Social Policy Bonds to goals that don't show their advantages over other, simpler, approaches will taint the concept. People would then see the bonds as a fancy means of enriching intermediaries (bondholders, financial market players), rather than a solution to social problems. (This might already be happening with Social Impact Bonds.) If there is anything society doesn't need, it's a financial services sector enriching itself still further by sucking the best mathematical brainpower out of the real economy, and contributing nothing of social value.

(c) Ronnie Horesh

Diverse, adaptive solutions to our social and environmental problems
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